Review

Published in Quadrant, circa 1989.

Kukathas advances two theses. The minor one asserts that Hayek provides a comprehensive social doctrine, which should engage the close attention of both the critics and the defenders of classical (non-socialist) liberalism. However it appears that Hayek falls short of the full statement that is required to identify the limits of individual freedom and the proper scope of government.

The major thesis concerns the grounds of liberalism. Kukathas argues that Hayek's defence rests on presuppositions that are incompatible. On the one hand, the scepticism and moral relativity of Hume; on the other, Kant's quest for rationally justified foundations of belief. The tension between these contrary tendencies emerges time after time as Kukathas explores Hayek's views on the key issues in political philosophy.

In his capacity as a conservative and sceptic Hayek asserts that ethics is not a matter of choice because "our morals are not (and cannot be) the product of design but are the result of a natural selection of traditions." However the traditionalist Hayek is driven to seek reasons for adhering to traditional morality and he has a rationalist's concern to defend principles such as the market order and the rule of law that are required for his vision of human progress. But to pursue these principles he is obliged to adopt an agenda of radical reform to "free the process of spontaneous growth from the obstacles and encumbrances that human folly has erected." But if these obstacles belong to our traditional heritage, then where do we stand to put the lever of reform under them? Tensions of this kind prompt Kukathas' conclusion that the foundations of Hayek's liberalism will not hold.

This conclusion begs the question that Kukathas raises in his final chapter on modern liberalism. "First, is it a defensible ideal and, secondly, how might it be defended?" These questions have taken on fresh urgency with Gray's announcement in the Postscript to his latest book that he has defected from liberalism due to its lack of rational foundations. This is a rather odd stance because Minogue's contribution to Traditions of Liberalism (CIS 1988) shows that whatever classical liberalism may be it is not a foundationist enterprise. A similar view is implicit in a major, though unargued, conclusion by Kukathas that "Liberal theorists should turn away from their preoccupation with uncovering Kantian foundations for liberalism, and look again to Hume."

In Hume we find a critical temper of mind, a blend of scepticism with respect for the truth and for valuable traditions. At the same time he recognised the need for continual improvement in our knowledge, our institutions and our practices. The challenge is to sustain Hume's critical mood without lapsing into the corrosive form of moral relativism, which denies that there is any rational way to choose between rival theories or moral principles. The usual rejoinder to this latter view is to insist (like Kant) that there is indeed some authoritative source of justified beliefs. Unfortunately, opinions differ on the appropriate authority and all such theories run into the dilemma of "the infinite regress versus dogmatism".

This arises as follows. If a belief claims validation by a supporting argument, what justifies the support? Where and how does the chain of justifications stop? If one attempts to provide reasons for the supporting argument then an infinite regress can be forced by anyone who presses for more supporting statements which in turn demand justification. It appears that this can only be avoided by an arbitrary decision to stop the regress at some stage and settle on a dogmatic belief at that point. This is Scruton's stance in renouncing the notion that any program of major reform can be justified, so that equality and freedom may be sacrificed to "the absolute claim of the locally given."

The dilemma of the infinite regress arises from the widespread assumption that beliefs are only rational or valid if indeed they are positively (certainly) justified. The solution that is offered by Karl Popper and his late colleague William W. Bartley is to abandon the quest for positive justification. Instead we should settle for a critical preference for one option rather than others, in the light of arguments and evidence offered to that point. This stance allows for the revision of preferences in the light of new evidence or arguments, for unconscious acceptance of tacit beliefs (for the moment) and for the uncritical acceptance of beliefs that are not regarded as problematic (again for the moment). This appears to be a simple, commonsense position but it defies the dominant traditions of Western thought which are mostly concerned with theories of justification. If the stance of "critical preference" is adopted then the tension between the Humean and Kantian tendencies in Hayek's thought may be resolved.

With his foundational problems in order then some of the difficulties in the body of his work may dissolve in turn. For example, the cluster of liberal policies (free trade, limited government, the rule of law etc) may be held on the grounds of critical preference over their rivals, given the larger objectives of peace, freedom and prosperity. Such a preference does not rest on faith or foundations, merely on the evidence of centuries of conscious or unconscious experimentation.

After many years of neglect Hayek's ideas are starting to receive the kind of attention that they deserve. He is arguably the most significant political philosopher of the century and the efforts of Kukathas and others should ensure that it will soon be very difficult to write books in the social and policy sciences that pay little or no attention to him.