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NOTES ON METAPHYSICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS
With Criticism of Lakatos and Kuhn
DRAFT
Rafe Champion, 1985
During the early 1950s Popper prepared almost a thousand pages of manuscript for publication as a companion volume to the English translation of his
Logik Der Forschung (1934). This material started as a series of appendices to The Logic of Scientific Discovery but these grew to a point where they took on a life of their own. They were set up in galley proofs during 1956-57 to appear as a book titled Postscript: After Twenty Years. The 'twenty years was the period from 1934 to 1954.The Logic of Scientific Discovery
appeared in 1959 but the proof-reading of the much larger Postscript turned into a nightmare. Popper had operations on both eyes for detached retinas and after much delay further additions and corrections were made up to 1962 when this work was overtaken by other projects. These included editing the essays which appeared in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), writing and revising the papers which appeared as Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972), writing some hundreds of pages of intellectual autobiography and replies to critics in the Popper edition of the Library of Living Philosophers (1974) and a large book, The Self and its Brain, with Sir John Eccles (1977).
Photocopies of the galleys circulated among Popper's colleagues and students, and parts had some early impact, especially by way of Imre Lakatos and his "methodology of scientific research programmes" (MSRP). Unfortunately, this development has caused a great deal of confusion and misplaced effort which might have been avoided if Popper's theory of programs had appeared earlier.
By 1978 it seemed that Popper would never find the time or the energy to pull the manuscript together, especially as advances in physics continually called for revision. William W. Bartley III undertook the task of editing the vast bulk of material and this finally appeared in three volumes (with further additions) in 1982 and 1983. These are books are
Realism and the Aim of Science (Volume 1), The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (Volume 2) and Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (Volume 3).The third volume contains a 'Metaphysical Epilogue' that is remarkable in at least two ways. First, it is apparently the unacknowledged basis of Lakatos's theory of scientific research programmes. Second, it provides a key to understanding a set of themes that unify Popper's whole system of thought. Some of these themes are metaphysical in nature, that is, they cannot be refuted (or verified) by evidence. They contradict a cluster of metaphysical ideas that have dominated Western thought from the time of Descartes, if not longer.
Popper's work can be seen as defence of a set of epistemological, metaphysical and methodological principles and a critical demolition of rivals. He depicts the contest as follows:
1. Indeterminism versus Determinism.
2. Realism versus Instrumentalism.
3. Objectivism versus Subjectivism.
However a larger list encompases more of Popper's central ideas and extends more obviously into the social sciences where his ideas are even less appreciated (if that is possible) than is his contribution to the philosophy of physics.
Popper Rival
Fallibilism or non-justificationism Dogmatism or justificationism
Non-essentialism Essentialism
(definitions are not fundamental) (conceptual analysis)
Realism Idealism
Objective knowledge Knowledge is belief
Non-determinism Determinism
Non-reductionism (emergence) Reductionism
Situational analysis and Holism
methodological individualism
Popper's theory of MRPs flows from his theory that we should look at the history of a subject, and its current status, in terms of its problem situations. In the Metaphysical Epilogue to
Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics on page 161 he wrote:In science, problem situations are the result, as a rule, of three factors. One is the discovery of an inconsistency within the ruling theory. A second is the discovery of an inconsistency between theory and experiment - the experimental falsification of the theory. The third, and perhaps the most important one, is the relation between the theory and what may be called the "metaphysical research programme".
In using this term I wish to draw attention to the fact that in almost every phase of the development of science we are under the sway of metaphysical - that is, untestable - ideas; ideas which not only determine what problems of explanation we shall choose to attack, but also what kinds of answers we shall consider as fitting or satisfactory or acceptable, and as improvements of, or advances on, earlier answers.
By raising the problems of explanation which the theory is designed to solve, the metaphysical research programme makes it possible to judge the success of the theory as an explanation. On the other hand, the critical discussion of the theory and its results may lead to a change in the research programme (usually an unconscious change, as the programme is often held unconsciously, and taken for granted), or to its replacement by another programme. These programmes are only occasionally discussed as such: more often, they are implicit in the theories and in the attitudes and judgements of the scientists.
I call these research programmes "metaphysical" also because they result from general views of the structure of the world and,at the same time, from general views of the problem situation in physical cosmology. I call them "research programmes" because they incorporate, together with a view of what the most pressing problems are, a general idea of what a satisfactory solution of these problems would look like (cp.
The term 'program' (which I will use in place of 'programme') implies that these metaphysical ideas tend to cluster together and support each other in various ways; they also provide historical continuity despite changes in the status of testable theories.
The program largely determines the types of problems that are selected for investigation, the methods of approach used and the types of solution that are considered appropriate.
Popper's theory of metaphysical research programs can be used to identify and criticise ideas in 'rival programs' which are often regarded as the basic categories of thought, ultimate presuppositions or framework assumptions. These theories, such as determinism, justificationism, subjectivism (knowledge as belief) and the method of conceptual analysis (essentialism) are shared by most philosophical schools and for this reason they are seldom in dispute. They operate as invisible boundaries that dictate the type of problems that people choose to work on, the way that they are formulated and the type of solutions that are deemed acceptable. These boundaries render certain theories and methods either wrong, or stupid, or ideologically unsound, or in extreme cases, simply unthinkable. They provide the intellectual equivalent of an ecological niche where some species of ideas are stunted or killed outright while others survive and flourish. They are not amenable to experimental test or falsification, so they have persisted unchallenged by the rise of empiricism in the philosophy of science and by the triumphs of science itself. Far from being challenged by science, some of these ideas are located at the core of modern physics and they derive strength from their association with popular interpretations of quantum physics.
The influence of metaphysical ideas is in no way reduced by the positivists' aversion to metaphysics in toto. The philosophy of science from the time of Hume has been intensely hostile to metaphysics and in this century alone , the logical positivists have wanted to brand metaphysics literally meaningless, while the pragmatists and instrumentalists have hardly been more hospitable. The positivist program aimed to drive metaphysics out of science and philosophy, but people who try to deny a role to metaphysical ideas simply render them invisible, hence immune to criticism.
Metaphysical ideas such as determinism and reductionism have proved almost impossible to subject to effective criticism because discussion of them has mostly been pursued by conceptual analysis under the influence of the errors that Popper labelled 'essentialsm'. The resulting proliferation of unhelpful verbiage has done much to prejudice people against metaphysics. It is often assumed that metaphysical theories are beyond the limits of rational criticism because they provide the framework of discourse. A widespread view (held by Popper in his youth) claims that the domain of rational criticism is limited to areas where empirical tests can be used.
Popper has addressed this situation in two ways. First, the theory of metaphysical research programs has the capacity to make metaphysical theories visible, in the same way that an improved microscope brings objects into sharp focus where previously they were either invisible or indistinct. Second, he has shown that metaphysical theories can be critically discussed, even though they are not empirically testable, and it is possible to criticise and compare rival theories. (He did this first in a paper reprinted in
Conjectures and Refutations). In this paper, and others, he has provided criticisms of (and alternatives to) the theories of reductionism, determinism and subjectivism in the context of live scientific problems. A prime example of this is Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, which explores the impact subjectivism and determinism on the interpretation of theories in quantum physics.
According to Popper (
Quest, section 33) he started talking about MRPs in lectures in 1949 though it did not get into print until 1958 ("On the status of science and metaphysics", reprinted in Conjectures).Both Agassi and Feyerabend in their contributions to the volume edited by Bunge for Popper's 60th birthday talk about the importance of metaphysics in leading the way for science (
The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, 1964). But again, no mention of MRPs and no specific mention of Popper as a stimulant in developing these particular ideas.
Bryan Magee in the Postscript to his Fontana Modern Masters
Popper (1973) wrote that the Metaphysical Epilogue to the Postscript was among the finest things Popper had ever written. But neither in Magee's own Postscript nor in the body of the book did he give any indication of the nature of the theory contained in Popper's Epilogue.
I think it is fair to say that nobody outside the Popper School could have gained an inkling of the nature and importance of MRPs until 1982 when the third volume of the Postscript appeared.
The Contribution of Lakatos
Bartley wrote (in
Philosophia,1982) that MRPs were a major topic of discussion in the London School of Economics when he arrived near the end of the 1950s. But the notion of programmes reached the world outside by way of Lakatos and his writings on "the methodology of scientific research programmes". Lakatos was a truly remarkable individual by any standards. In Hungary he was a member of the communist party but fell out of favour and spent some time in prison. He escaped in 1956 and completed his doctoral studies in the philosophy of mathematics at Cambridge in 1959. At the London School of Economics he became something of an entrepreneur in the academic industry, organising a major international colloquium in the philosophy of science in 1965. As described by Agassi 'He thus launched Popper into the limelight, inaugurated the Popper philosophical school, and acted as its major-domo; soon he took over its leadership. He gained ever more international reputation and notoriety, then departed the scene abruptly' (he died suddenly in 1974) ( Agassi's article is "The legacy of Lakatos", in Phil. Soc. Sci., 1979, vol 9: 316).In the context of the long-running debate with Kuhn it is usually accepted that Lakatos took over the running from Popper to save whatever could be retrieved from the 'falsificationist' programme which was widely (though falsely) supposed to have been destroyed in its distinctly Popperian form by Kuhn's theory of paradigms and by similar criticisms launched by Feyerabend and Lakatos himself.
Here are some of the comments that have been made; examples like these could be multiplied indefinitely.
Alasdair Macintyre "Epistemological crises, dramatic narrative, and the philosophy of science", pp. 54-74. In Gutting (ed)
Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Khun's Philosophy of Science, (1980).p. 71: "In 1968, while he was still a relatively conservative Popperian, Lakatos had written 'the appraisal is rather of a series of theories than of an isolated theory'. He went on to develop this notion into that of a research program".Macintyre went on to contrast Popper with Polanyi (the Burke of the philosophy of science, allowing reasoning only in the context of a tradition) and Feyerabend, (the Emerson, seeing tradition as merely repressive of individuals).
Popper has rightly tried to make something of the notion of rational tradition. What hindered this attempt was the Popperian insistence with replacing the false methodology of induction by a new methodology. This history of Popper's own thought and that of his most gifted followers was for quite a number of years the history of successive attempts to replace Popper's original falsificationism by some more adequate version, each of which in turn fell prey to counterexamples from the history of science.
Mark Blaug in his contribution to Gutting (ed) wrote that "Lakatos developed and extended Popper's philosophy of science into a critical tool of historical research, virtually resolving a long-standing puzzle about the relationship between positive history of science and normative methodology for scientists".
McMullen in "The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in science", in Cohen et. al. (eds) suggested:
What is needed is a shift of emphasis from "novelty" to "fertility"...This is accomplished, in part at least, by Imre Lakatos who has insisted more than has any other philosopher on making the unit for appraisal in science a historical one, a "research program" or a series of connected theories, rather than a single theory. Indeed, he has even made this the defining feature of his entire methodology. Lakatos argues that Popper's theory of science is inapplicable to actual scientific practice, mainly because he overestimates the falsifying force of single instances'. [see also notes].
Alan Chalmers in his widely read book
What Is This Thing Called Science? (second edition 1982) claimed that Popper had no answer to the critics of his falsificationism.'Lakatos developed his picture of science [the methodology of scientific research programmes] in an attempt to improve on, and overcome the objections to, Popperian falsificationism'. (page 80).
Lakatos developed his theory with the benefit of Popper's ideas fully formed in the manuscript of
The Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery which remained in galleys from 1957 to the 1980s, while circulating among Popper's students and colleagues from 1957 onward.Lakatos acknowledged this debt in his paper in
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Lakatos and Musgrave, (1970, page 183), where he even quoted from the metaphysical epilogue. But in developing the theory, (he thought improving it) he actually precipitated some major degenerative problem-shifts, sometimes described as 'Popperian epicycles'.(How? He was acutely aware of the problem of justificationism, he knew about world 3. Why did he have to make the core of the programme unfalsifiable?) Did he refer to Popper's MRPs in subsequent papers?
Parallel Views
Several other writers appear to have ideas similar in some respects to Popper's theory of metaphysical research programmes, though as I will argue later they all suffer from various defects which derive from the program that Popper has challenged, in particular from the justificationist, subjective and essentialist elements.
Kuhn's paradigms can perhaps be interpreted as mixtures of MRP and testable theories. They are also subjective, so they rapidly lead to conceptual analysis, with problems in the meaning of terms and, in the end, incomensurability.
Toulmin came close to the notion of MRPs (using totally different language)though his account of MRPs is subjective also. In "Rationality and the changing aims of inquiry" (from Suppes et al (eds)
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV North Holland 1973) he wrote:We have from the outset to drive a wedge between (a) the formal criteria by appeal to which we judge arguments framed in terms of the currently established concepts of any science, and (b) the substantive criteria by appeal to which we judge whether some proposed conceptual innovation is or is not an improvement...The character of these conceptual selection criteria, or standards for judging conceptual improvements, depend directly on what, in the particular domain of science, is conceived of at the particular time as "doing a better explanatory job" (p 892)
It appears that his 'substantive criteria' are the criteria provided by a MRP. On p. 895 he moved to defuse objections that these criteria are arbitrary, subjective or the products of human idiosyncrasy unchecked by external requirements. His problem here is, of course, to provide an account that avoids subjectivism and the resulting reduction of conceptual schemes to various kinds of social, material or ideological bases in the absence of a theory of autonomous ideas.
He concludes that we can give a rational account of th history of science 'only if we are prepared to pay a properly historical attention to the changing intellectual strategies and principles of conceptual change by which the evolving intellectual content of those sciences has been selectively perpetuated'. It seems clear that he is talking about something very similar to metaphysical research programmes, though of course he is using the language of conceptual analysis.
Hanson may have come close as well; his patterns of discovery may in fact be patterns of development of MRPs. Similarly, the themes described by Gerald Holton (which he regards as psychological phenonena) can better be described as MRPs.
MRPs occur outside science; Hulme in Speculations was working on a MRP for art and literature (and possibly for society at large). This programme became as influential as any in the literature of the 20th century due to its assimilation by Pound and Eliot.
Some problems with Lakatos and Kuhn
The value of Popper's theory of MRPs can be brought out by contrast with the views of Lakatos and Kuhn; the value of the theory of MRPs is that it helps to direct critical attention to areas that are particularly in need of criticism, while Lakatos and Kuhn pay no critical attention to these areas at all. ("These areas" are the metaphysical elements of the MRP, or the rival MRPs).
Paradigm theory seems to fail at every point, in describing the dynamics of change, and in opening up fruitful questions for further research, whether in the subject itself, in the history of its development or in the methodology of science or historical reconstruction.
Paradigm theory, and also Lakatosian research program theory does not assist in pinpointing where open problems call for one or more of the following responses:
a) efforts to devise critical experiments to test rival (testable) theories,
b) efforts to criticise elements of competing MRPs,
c) efforts to explore how elements of the MRPs are intruding into work (and arguments) in progress, and in particular how elements within an MRP are in conflict and so create problems in sorting out the elements of the open problem situation.(examples? Popper on the way determinism forced subjectivism upon people in quantum mechanics).
Part of the problem in generating criticism of MRPs is the old problem of the status of non-empirical theories (like moral theories) and how to go about being critical of them in a rational and non-justificationist way. The assumption is widespread that rational criticism cannot exceed the bounds of the empirical, an assumption that Popper held in his early days but later rejected (hence his critical discussion of metaphysical theories in C & R).
On my reading, Lakatos's theory is a paradigm of a degenerative problem shift, so much so that after his last major paper (in the Boston Studies) Kuhn was able to say that Lakatos had virtually joined him on most key points. Lakatos revived induction and blocked criticism (of the hard core of the programme). But on my interpretation of MRPs:
(a) much if not all of the hard core is metaphysical (and so irrefutable by its nature, not by fiat as Lakatos would have it);
(b) it is precisely in the hard core that criticism is most needed (in order to usher in the 'new programme' of CCR, objectivism, non-determinism, non-essentialism, emergence).
Since Lakatos broke with Popper most of the debates have been about induction and the falsifiabilty criterion; the more important and exciting topic of MRPs has been largely ignored. And some people who are fundamentally on side with Popper against Kuhn and Feyerabend hope that the Lakatos program of scientific research programmes can be developed to save the day. Of course this should all change now that the Postscript is out, though now [in 1999]more than a decade has passed and there is no sign of widespread application of the ideas.
Returning to the Shilp volumes to read the contributions by Kuhn and Lakatos, and Popper's replies, there is no mention of MRPs. Here Popper could have used his theory of MRPs to meet Kuhn's closing challenge to join him in exploration of the 'psychology of knowledge', or the background to the act of creating a theory (as opposed to the logic of scientific discovery that is concerned with criticism of theories already 'given'). It may be noted that Popper has reasons for neglecting the psychology of discovery; as a student of psychology he explored that avenue and decided that it was a dead end; the way to make discoveries is to work critically and imaginatively on open problems (as stated in
Unended Quest p. 47). But he could have gone on to note that the MRP provides the professionally shared imperatives that Kuhn talks about, with the crucial proviso that the elements of the MRP are open to criticism, just as soon as we become aware of them.
And in Popper's reply to Lakatos in Schilp, there is next to no talk about research programmes at all (whether metaphysical or scientific), though surely this was the place to point out the origin of the theory of research programmes and to point out how the Lakatos programme obscured the metaphysical elements of the problem situation, which is precisely where critical attention is most needed during periods of crisis.
It almost seems that there was a conspiracy to keep the world from knowing about MRPs, a conspiracy involving Popper himself.
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