University of Toronto Press, 1989.

Unpublished review circa 1993

Douglas Williams of the Department of Political Studies at Queens University in Kingston (Canada) has written a wide-ranging account of Popper's thought with the emphasis on the social and political aspects of his ideas. The intention of the author was to draw out both the strengths and limitations of Popper's work from the perspective of a critical admirer. This stance has enabled him to identify some aspects of Popper's work that are generally neglected, especially the moral dimension of his thought which Williams regards as a pervasive unifying principle. He also notes that virtually nothing has been written about Popper's defence of the cultural ideals of Western society and a major aim of the book is to show "the sustaining unity and power of Popper's vision" as it runs through his work in cosmology, philosophy, science, history and politics.

Williams comments that Popperian exegesis has polarised between disciples and vehement critics. It appears that he has achieved a balance of a kind by occupying each extreme in turn. In one mode he writes:

'During the last four decades, and spanning a seemingly endless number of fields of inquiry, Popper has established himself as one of the most significant thinkers of our century...Few thinkers in our century have possessed the intellectual powers, the courage, and the faith in humanity necessary to sustain such a project. Bertrand Russell is perhaps the last that comes to mind'(viii).

In the critical mode he raises myriad objections, large and small, to Popper's psychology, his epistemology, and his politics, concluding that some of Popper's ideas, especially his concept of rationality, are not consistent with the maintenance of human freedom and autonomy.

After a summary of the book and some passing comments, this review will focus on three topics. First, Popper's epistemology and its cultural significance. Second, Popper's views on the self and modes of explanation in the human sciences. Third, politics and the legitimate extent of state activity.

1

Following a brief introductory chapter Williams proceeds to sketch the social and intellectual influences upon Popper during his formative years. He notes that virtually nothing has been written about the momentous impact on Popper of his youthful experience of war-torn Vienna. This has subsequently changed with the publication of a significant fragment of biography by William W. Bartley [1]. Williams has picked up most of the essential features of this period, notably Popper's concern with the spectacle of grinding poverty and his fleeting involvement in the communist movement. Bartley's most significant additions to our knowledge of Popper are his detailed account of Popper's engagement with Arnold Schonberg's music and with the problem of rationality and belief as formulated by Kierkegaard.

In the third chapter Williams digs deep to locate the roots of Popper's ideas. He suggests that Popper followed Kant's defence of human dignity and moral autonomy against the twin threats of mechanistic determinism (pace Newton) and skepticism (pace Hume.) This is a fertile formulation that could have led directly to an account of Popper's responses to these threats, namely indeterminism, fallibilism, a non-authoritarian theory of knowledge and a limited 'non-justificationist' theory of rationality. Instead, Williams embarks on an account of the rise of science and the battle to maintain a sense of enchantment in a culture of science and technocratic politics. The remaining chapters examine Popper's methodology for the natural sciences (Chapter 4), his prescriptions for the social sciences (Chapter 5) and his defence of liberalism (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). Chapter 6 defends Mannheim from some Popperian criticism.

One of Williams's problems is that he has tried to achieve too much in 200 pages. This tendency is especially apparent in Chapter 4, where in less than thirty pages he covers the development of most of Popper's leading ideas in epistemology and the philosophy of science. This is too densely packed for an introduction and it is likely to confuse people who come to the book in search of Popper's social philosophy. At the end of the chapter Williams changes from the descriptive to the critical mode and delivers an essentially negative verdict on Popper's psychology and also his epistemology. These criticisms will be examined in due course.

Williams begins Chapter 5 with a sketch of Popper's 'critical rationalism', that is, the attitude of embracing reason "on faith" as an alternative to relativism in theory and violence in practical conflict resolution. He then outlines Popper's views on the logic of the social sciences, maintaining his view that Popper's moralism provides a unifying theme in his work. He notes that Popper follows Weber in promoting an "ethic of responsibility" which requires people (and especially social scientists) to give an account of the likely consequences of their actions and of social policies. Williams argues that 'such an ethic of responsibility, based on the "dualism of facts and standards", lies at the heart of Popper's views on the proper methodology of the social sciences as well as his interpretation of liberalism'. (91)

'According to our interests, we could, for instance, write about the history of art; or of language; or of feeding habits; or of typhus fever (see Zinsser's Rats, Lice and History)...There is no [one] history of mankind, there is only an indefinite number of histories of all kinds of aspects of human life'.

Williams' criticism of Popper's allegedly reductionist attitude towards human activity and his excessively "thin" concept of human agency will be treated later. Chapter 7, like Chapter 4, moves rapidly through a range of Popper's ideas, then concludes with a flurry of criticism. Williams' notes Popper's impulse to maintain the institutions and traditions which permit the growth of knowledge and freedom. He scans various aspects of Popper's political principles, including Popper's objections to utopian planning and the principles which he proposes to guide public policy (promotion of tolerance, minimisation of suffering and fighting tyranny.) Much of this will be informative for people who have only encountered Popper's views in dismissive or hostile asides thrown out by writers who disagree with Popper's ideas but do not explain them or subject them to frontal assault.

The criticisms in this chapter include Popper's 'reductive and atomistic individualism', his failure to appreciate the ideal of the good life in a free and egalitarian society and his failure to offer inspiration for the "support of collective goals". Williams claims, as a criticism, that Popper "flies in the face of powerful forms of self-consciously communal politics - the politics of ethnicity and of caste, regionalism, religious communalism and a host of varieties of separatism, to name only the most explosive" (page 164).

II

Williams dissents radically, claiming that Popper's non-inductive approach implies that learning by observation and past experience is a fiction (page 81). He also finds fault with Popper's

'...inability, or unwillingness, to appreciate the positive need for inductive habits of thought in all practical activity, including science itself; and the problems that consequently arise for his overall, 'heroic' conception of science and scientific progress' (80)

Williams's case for the dismissal of Popper's epistemology is quite inadequate, even allowing that the main focus for the book is Popper's social theories. For example the point at issue between Popper and the inductivists is not whether we learn from experience but is how. At the personal level Popper has argued that the process of learning by repetition of actions is best described as a process of trial and error elimination [3]. As for the public body of scientific knowledge, Hume's case against 'inductive proof' still stands, and it seems that the long rearguard action fought by Carnap and his followers to generate probability values for theories has come to nothing [4].

Williams, in company with most professional philosophers, has not accepted Popper's theory of knowledge, and Bartley has offered an explanation of this situation. He claims that Popper introduced a major problem-shift in philosophy, a shift which some would call a profound 'paradigm change'. In Bartley's terminology the traditional structure or 'metacontext' of Western thought has been authoritarian or 'justificationist'. This follows a clue given out by Popper when he noted that the traditional systems of epistemology resulted from various claims about the authoritative source of knowledge. (Popper went on to note that this approach has a counterpart in political theory where the great question has been "who shall rule?"). Bartley has explored how the quest for justified beliefs sponsors dogmatism among those who claim to have found the royal road to truth, and profound scepticism among others who claim that no such road exists. In contrast Popper's non-authoritarian epistemology offers the prospect of an expanding universe of knowledge, with critical preferences in place of justified beliefs. Williams makes no mention of Bartley's explanation of Popper's achievement and the way that this has created problems for commentators who are still operating in the 'justificationist' paradigm.

Williams claims that 'Natural science has been` modernity's most disenchanting force' (page 178). In fact it is a particular type of worldview (that of classical mechanics, allied with determinism and reductionism) and a particular type of scientific method (the inductive, fact gathering approach) which have been disenchanting for some people. The triumph of Newtonian mechanics was widely perceived as the full flowering of the mechanical (inductive) method of science, and simultaneously a vindication of the mechanistic world-view as well. This provoked a revolt by romantics and poets who could not stomach a view of human activity that had no place for the imagination, (a revolt echoed by the more recent 'counter-cultural movement'). Nor could the romantics accept the mechanical universe. The outcome of this collision of views has been a kind of cultural schizophrenia, with imagination set against reason, the organic against the mechanical, the inspiration of the poet against the empiricism of the scientist. For those who are sensitive to this situation, Popper's epistemology is a revelation and a liberation because it assigns complementary roles to the imagination, to reason, to traditions and to empirical evidence. Thus it disposes of the tensions and antagonisms which flow from partial and narrow views of learning and creativity.

One of the most disappointing features of the book is Williams' failure to rectify the situation which he noted himself, whereby virtually nothing has been written about Popper's defence of the cultural ideals of Western society. This is partly because Williams apparently does not understand the liberating effect of Popper's epistemology, described above. It has the potential to end the pervasive prejudice against science and reason that has been endemic in literary circles, especially those under the influence of various forms of romanticism [6]. Some of these prejudices were ventilated in the acrimonious and futile 'two cultures' debate initiated by C. P. Snow, a debate that made no sense in the light of Popper's ideas [7]. A very large catalogue could be compiled to document the literary, aesthetic, mystic and revolutionary movements which have revolted against science and reason, under the impression that this revolt was necessary to save imagination, creativity, spiritual values or freedom.

Another contribution to the cultural domain has been Popper's defence of the legitimate and essential function of metaphysics. Early in his career he allowed that metaphysical ideas might lead the way in science, perhaps turning into properly testable ideas as knowledge and experimental technology advanced. Later he developed a theory of 'metaphysical research programmes' to acknowledge that some metaphysical theories will always be present in science, though they can be subjected to criticism [8]. Thus Popper added his weight to that of Collingwood to correct the influence of logical positivism described by Priestly [9].

'The dismissal of metaphysics as mere fancy, ethics as a waste of words, left a vacuum, not to be filled by philosophy reduced to a narrow edge and its ally, science. It may be objected that logical positivism is highly technical and difficult, not for the general public. But any doctrine - and especially one that is new, original, and as irreverent and ruthlessly intolerant as any undergraduate would wish it to be - cannot be brilliantly expounded to some of the brightest young men in twenty or thirty universities without having some effect both inside and outside those universities. A certain atmospher was created...that seemed to narrow and chill the mind'.

In literary studies, Popper's theory of objective knowledge supports the theory of literature presented by Wellek and Warren [11]. Popper argues that there is a kind of objective content to descriptions, arguments and cultural objects which cannot be reduced entirely to materialistic or subjective terms. This line of argument offers a corrective to the expressionist theories that have inflicted considerable damage on the arts as vehicles of cultural and moral values [12]. In addition, Bartley's development of Popper's work on rationality and non-foundational knowledge provides a rejoinder to some of the less helpful tendencies of the deconstructionists [13]. In addition to the impact of his own writings, Popper's influence has spread through the agency of friends and admirers such as Isaac Azimov, Ernst Gombrich and Peter Medawar [14].

III

Turning to Williams' criticisms of Popper's contribution to the methods of the human sciences. Here the central deficiency that Williams identifies is Popper's 'thin' or 'abstract' concept of the self and human agency. In Williams' view this has adverse consequences throughout Popper's methodology and his philosophy of politics as well. Williams claims that Popper's thought is 'unfortunately reductionist towards the most significant dimensions of social inquiry - the deliberative, communicative and hermeneutic nature of human activity' (115). He suggests that Popper's 'situational analysis' could address these things if only it could be emancipated from the limitations of the covering law model of explanation, and Popper's 'thin' concept of the self.

More recently Popper announced his opinion that the 'covering law' account of causation is superseded in physics by an approach based on propensities [18]. Thus any suggestion that Popper's thoughts on explanation in the human sciences are hostage to the covering law model would appear to be completely superseded. For explanations in the human sciences, Popper has developed his views on situational analysis with an account of model building and the function of the rationality principle [19]. This is not explained by Williams, though it would tend to vindicate his suggestion that Popper's theory of situational analysis could be developed to do justice to the hermeneutic element of human communication. It must be said that Popper's account is far from being fully developed and free of problems, as Latsis and Jacobs have shown [20]. Clearly a great deal of work is required to establish the strengths and weaknesses of Popper's later ideas in this area and to explore the implications of other innovations such as the three world theory and the theory of metaphysical research programmes[21]. It is disappointing that Williams did not apparently try to make progress with this task though in fairness to him, apart from Jarvie's promising beginning there is virtually no body of work to draw upon to assess what a 'Popper program' in the human sciences might amount to.

A little more needs to be said on Williams' critique of Popper's 'thin' concept of the self and human agency. Williams would like to see a more 'embedded' concept of the self which does justice to the richness of human experience and the complicated internal dialogues which human actors create. Williams appears to echo Bartley's comments on Popper's comparative neglect of subjective consciousness ('World 2' in Popper's 'three world' ontology, as distinct from World 1 of material things and World 3 of abstract ideas).

'This neglect, however benign, and however appropriate in combating the subjective orientation of the justificationist metacontext, becomes regrettable here. For it appears that human beings have a natural psychological tendency to identify with positions and contexts, and therefore become positional...Popper's approach is incomplete as long as greater attention and responsibility is not given to World 2.[22]

IV

Proceeding to Williams' appraisal of Popper's political ideas. A central motif of Popper's political philosophy is the 'open society' where people may be the makers of their fates and not slaves to traditional taboos and institutions (as is the case in a 'closed society') [20]. The life of the open society calls for a critical attitude to tradition, but, as noted above, Popper has argued that this attitude is inhibited by the authoritarian structure of Western thought. A corollary of Popper's non-authoritarian epistemology is his view that the political question "who shall rule?" should be replaced by the question "how can we keep our rulers under control". A full account of Popper's political ideas would call for the unpacking of the implications of this radical problem-shift (paradigm change) in relation to all our political traditions and institutions. Williams has not attempted this. Instead he refers to Popper's

'marked antipathy towards contemporary politics...he repeatedly denigrates statesmen, the effect of nationalism and the nation state on world affairs, and power politics. Small wonder, then, that he places his faith in social engineers or technocrats to revitalise the liberal democracies' (183).

'Popper has probably got the relation between democracy and social engineering and technology just the opposite of the reality. As a regrettably small group of thinkers has been trying to snow since at least the time of Vico, the more decisions are entrusted to "expert" opinion, the more they are removed from the informed oversight, control and possible understanding of the general public. Popper seems secure in his rationalistic recommendations that we "plan" for our freedom by relying increasingly on the technological approach of "piecemeal engineers". But there is every indication that a bureaucratic culture has emerged and taken a deep hold on the liberal polities of our time; this trend threatens whatever measure of democracy they hitherto may have attained'.

The suggestion that Popper places his faith in social engineers and technocrats to revitalise the Western democracies is absurd. Popper advocates a method or process of piecemeal social reform as a realistic and rational alternative to revolutionary 'canvas cleaning' under the influence of utopian aspirations. The process of piecemeal social change is not supposed to proceed under the guidance or control of a special class or group of people with special knowledge, indeed the notion of a privileged group is one of the deficiencies that Popper finds with the utopian approach.

Williams refers to the present time as the 'age of Weber's Iron Cage', where systems dominate people and administration replaces politics.

'...bureaucracy and the ever-more sophisticated forms of technocratic administration are the direct consequence of the growth of rationality, as Popper typically uses the term' (184).

Hayek and Popper have both argued that coercive central planning has derived much inspiration from an arrogant and dogmatic conception of intellectual insight which Hayek labelled 'constructivist rationality'. This is a far cry from the type of modest and self-critical rationality expounded by Popper which is summed up in the attitude "you may be right and I may be wrong, and by an effort we may get nearer the truth' [footnote Chapter 24 of OSE] The bureaucratic culture which Williams deplores can hardly be attributed to this kind of rationality, especially as Popper propounds a limited, protective function of government which would minimise bureaucracy [footnote Popper's case for the protective state in OSE vol 1]. The growth of bureaucracy can largely be attributed to the expansion of state activity, which brings us to the heart of the issue that divides Popper and Williams in the area of political philosophy, namely the appropriate nature and extent of state intervention in society.

Discretionary intervention may call for confiscation of property, allocation of licences or quotas for trading, or the direction of labour and investment. State activity to police 'rules of the game' that are binding on all parties would be acceptable to Popper but the second form of intervention is not. Here he follows Hayek's distinction between rules and orders.

Williams, in contrast, has apparently adopted the left liberal or socialist liberal stance to expand the scope of state intervention. Neither the rationale for this, nor any specific policies, are spelled out. It appears to be an unstated presupposition which emerges by implication in the course of critical commentary, for example, in his remarks on Popper's antipathy towards contemporary politics and his failure to provide 'even a hint of politics as a field of creative activity or of a social science that might help expand such a sphere' [p 183].

With the death of the Soviet system and the central planning model this difference between market liberals and socialist liberals or social democrats is probably the most profound issue in political philosophy. Fortunately it does not have to be debated only at the level of philosophy because over the last century there has been sufficient expansion of state activity to provide an abundance of evidence to evaluate the results. This is truly an area where examination of unintended consequences is required but typically this scrutiny is not provided by the architects or the proponents of the massive health, education, welfare, and other programs that have been launched. [Footnote Jewkes on 'ordeals by planning', Charles Murray on the US welfare system and Sowell on affirmative action]

V

In Williams' conclusion, he wrote that his aim was to faithfully reconstruct the unity of Popper's vision by pursuing an 'immanent critique'. That is, 'criticism of a man or woman's thought is held to flow from his or her own assumptions and values' (185). He wanted to improve on the excessively specialised and polemical nature of most of the commentary on Popper's work. This is a worthy aim but not one that Williams achieved, possibly because he did not make use of Bartley's account of the 'metacontextual shift' generated by Popper's non-authoritarian theory of knowledge and politics. Consequently Williams has been unable to do justice to Popper's epistemology and its cultural implications.

A similar problem has apparently occurred with Williams' critique of Popper's politics, especially Popper's views on the limited, protective role of the state. Williams has promulgated some very misleading statements, on Popper's views about the role of technocrats and social engineering, for example. This is a situation where the imminent critique may need to be supplemented by an account of Williams' own assumptions and values because they have apparently influenced his adverse comments on Popper.

The result is a book containing a confusing mixture of praise and criticism. If the criticisms were valid, Williams' high opinion of Popper would appear to be unwarranted. For the most part they are not valid, and one wonders how some of the more spectacular misreadings survived the screening of all the helpers he acknowledged. One also wonders what kind of impression this book will make on people who have not read Popper. Clearly the best thing that can happen will be for people to read some of the books and make up their own minds on the problems and issues raised by Williams. Notes 1. William W. Bartley, "Rehearsing a Revolution. Karl Popper: A Life. A section entitled Music and Politics: Karl Popper Meets Arnold Schonberg and the Eislers and Gives up Communism". An extract made for delivery at the Pacific Regional Meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, Christchurch, New Zealand, Novemeber 27-30, 1989.

20. Spiro Latsis, Straun Jacobs

22. William W. Bartley, "Rationality, Criticism and Logic" op cit.